Foreign Office Files for China, 1949-1980

Foreign Office Files for China, 1949-1980

"This is an immensely powerful new resource for our understanding of the early Cold War era in China.  British diplomats were present in China and able to witness the country's massive social  transformation under Mao.  These documents will be crucial in helping us to answer many key questions on both domestic and international policy in the early years of the People's Republic of China."

Professor Rana Mitter, Institute for Chinese Studies, University of Oxford

 

Consultant Editors:

Professor Cindy Yik-yi Chu, Department of History, Hong Kong Baptist University
Dr Chi-Kwan Mark, Department of History, University of London
Professor Rana Mitter, Institute for Chinese Studies, University of Oxford
Professor John Y. Wong, Department of History, University of Sydney

Source Library:

The National Archives (UK), Kew

Nature of the Material:

This is a fundamental resource for all those interested in the history of Modern China. Available in three sections covering the period 1949-1980, this project addresses a crucial period in Chinese history, from the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949, to the death of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the arrest of the Gang of Four, and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976.

Section I: 1949-1956
Section II: 1957-1966
Section III: 1967-1980

We make available the complete British Foreign Office Files dealing with China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in this period. These files are particularly important because Britain was one of the first countries to recognise Communist China. The quality and depth of the Foreign Office’s reporting on politics, industry, trade and cultural affairs is formidable.

All files can be systematically searched using our full text search capability.

Scope of the Collection:

These files allow scholars and researchers the opportunity to examine developments in China and to assess US, Soviet, British, European and Commonwealth relations with China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), from 1949 onwards.

The documents combine eye-witness accounts, weekly and monthly summaries, annual reviews, reports and analyses with a synthesis of newspaper articles and conference reports, economic assessments and synopses on leading Chinese personalities. There is a constant exchange of information between London and the British Embassy in Beijing and its consular outposts and a continual dialogue on issues relating to East Asia between Britain and America as well as with European and Commonwealth partners. Sino-Soviet relations also become a very important consideration in the Cold War era.

"This is a priceless collection on changes and developments of China since 1949. The British Foreign Office Files certainly offer much insight into Chinese Communism, and they are significant source materials for anyone interested in contemporary Chinese history. Professors, researchers, and students of contemporary China and Chinese foreign relations will find this collection fascinating and tremendously useful. It is wise to produce a digitised version of the materials, and this will greatly facilitate research and studies of contemporary China."

Professor Cindy Yik-yi Chu, Department of History, Hong Kong Baptist University

 

Section I: 1949-1956

From the seizure of power by the Communists forces, with dramatic accounts of the civil war years, the fall of Nanking, the fate of HMS Amethyst on the Yangtze River and the repercussions for international companies with a strong presence in China, through to Mao Zedong’s first attempts to implement a Soviet style command economy, with the emphasis on heavy industry, the material in Section I provides extensive coverage of major events with regular analyses by British officials.

Key topics covered include:

• in depth analysis of the Communist Revolution and all the major figures.
• the Korean War.
• the economic situation in China, industrialisation and modernisation.
• HMS Amethyst and the blockade of the Yangtze River.
• differences between British and American policy on China.
• the Chinese Communist threat to Hong Kong.
• land reform and redistribution benefitting some 60% of the population, but persecuting over a million people who often lost their lives and well as their lands.
• American military support and financial aid for Formosa/Taiwan. Between 1953 and 1957 US economic and military aid to Taiwan totalled US $1,708 million.
• Chinese military machinations and the Cold War.

Each year a series of files provides extensive detail on the internal political situation in China. The files for 1949 cover pivotal events in the history of modern China. From the beginning of the year, the tone set by British officials in these documents paints a pessimistic picture of Nationalist fortunes, accepting that it is only a matter of time before the Communists triumph.  The erosion of Nationalist authority and power is portrayed in vivid detail as town after town and city after city falls to the steady advance of the Communists; the British Consulate-General at Tsingtao provides a particularly graphic and compelling account of the Communist takeover of that city:

“Thursday 2 June 1949. General Liu sailed away at about 9.45 am leaving behind about 2,000 troops.  Then wholesale looting commenced at the Wharf.
10.30 am: Communists at Syfang.
Noon: Communists had arrived and had taken over the Custom House and at once stopped the looting on the Wharf.
1.30 pm: More Communists crossing the golf course...
2.00 pm: Heard the report that 2,000 troops left behind tried to commandeer a Norwegian coal vessel and force the Captain to take them out.  This consulate telephoned the Officer in command of the troops and the argument took long enough to allow the Communists to settle the dispute.
4.00 pm: Communists took over the Bank of China and the Central Bank of China.
4.30 pm: Communists now coming in from all directions.
6.15 pm: They took over the government offices, but the flag was not hauled down... Communists arrived quite unprepared to take over as they did not expect to come in until the end of the week.  There do not appear to be many here yet. A most marvellously quiet and peaceful take over. 

The troops on entering Tsingtao looked very weary, foot sore and weather beaten, ages vary
from 15-50 all wearing apparently new uniforms, the khaki varying very much in colour, from greenish to a ghastly mustard, the political forces wore grey uniforms.  There are many women in the forces.  The troops do not appear to have much in the way of equipment, this is probably due to the main force not having arrived yet, but they apparently have enough to keep peace and order however.  From general appearances, it is a mystery how they walked through the nationalists.  The foreign community have settled down much relieved that the occupation has at last taken place...”
(please see FO 371/75764).

The Western powers had hoped that it might take the Communists a year or more to establish a central government with authority extending over all China, thus giving them a breathing space in which to avoid the thorny question of recognition.  The establishment of the People's Republic in the autumn of 1949 and the subsequent Soviet recognition meant that the issue could no longer be dodged, and the debates which resulted in Britain's recognition of the Beijing government in January 1950 are covered in detail. America's unambiguous opposition to the new regime in Beijing, and the increased hostility of the United States against communism in general, meant that whilst the Americans increasingly relied on British intelligence to find out about events inside China, increased interest was also shown in Britain's relationship with China and her new Communist rulers. 

A total of 45 files for 1949 focus on the events leading to the formation of a communist government of the Peoples Republic of China and record the progress of the Revolution and the eventual triumph of Mao Zedong. A large grouping of 21 files covers the recognition of the Communist Government of China, in particular discussions between Britain and other governments on the question of recognition of the two rival governments.

By early 1950 the country was firmly under communist control (apart from a few pockets of Kuomingtang resistance) and the new Government enjoyed “a wide measure of support from the great majority of the people” (see FO 371/92189). Internationally, although China was not popular with Western countries, an increasing number were recognising the new regime at the expense of the Nationalist Government on Formosa/Taiwan, and despite the hostility of the United States, the People’s Republic was not without friends. The Soviet Union and its satellites were quick to establish links with the Beijing Government, and various treaties were signed to strengthen the growing body of countries that were joining the Communist camp. But China’s needs were so vast that even the Soviet Union, herself still suffering from the ravages of the Second World War, could offer only token material help to Mao Zedong. (For more details on Sino-Soviet relations in these years please see FO 371/83313-83318, 83381, 92293, 92301, 110221, 110244, 110283, 115006, 115100 and 120890). There is an interesting paper comparing Chinese and Soviet Communism and trying to identify the major differences in FO 371/115219.

Sir John Hutchinson’s report on conditions in China compiled during his eighteen months’ stay as HM Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing and filed in 1951 is to be found in FO 371/92220. The files for 1950 look at the numerous committees and conferences established in order to reorganise and modernise every aspect of Chinese life. These included a National Conference of Combat Heroes and Labour Models, a Press Conference, a Relief Workers Conference, a Customs Conference, a Co-operative Conference, Health, Judicial and Scientific Workers’ Conferences, a Higher Education Conference, and a Water Conservative Conference, to name but a few. In areas of local government there was also a radical re-organisation, with regional conferences and congresses held throughout the country to establish a systematic model of local administration. New national laws were passed to regulate taxation, trade unions, religion, and the treatment of China’s minorities. The most radical measures, however, were those relating to marriage and agrarian reform.

The Marriage Law was designed to end the traditional subservient role assigned to Chinese women and to ‘release the political energies of women for the benefit of the revolution’. The Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950 was equally radical in its attempt to bring benefit to the peasant classes who made up the bulk of Chinese society. Ambitious in its aims to reform the agricultural forces of over a hundred million peasants, the Law was designed to distribute land and collectivise agriculture.

British trade with China was a principal concern for British officials, with particular reference to shipping, British companies operating in China, trade with Macau and Hong Kong, events in the Shanghai region, and the trade agreement between China and the Soviet Union. The US embargo on exports to China is discussed in FO 371/92272-92287 and the Chinese takeover of American companies is reported in FO 371/92294.

Britain’s concern for its colonial interests is a prevalent theme of the files for the early 1950s. Each year a series of files covers the situation of British and foreign commercial interests and individuals in China along with Chamber of Commerce reports on the difficulties faced by foreign traders, (see for instance the 1951 files: FO 371/92259-92267 and the 1952 files: FO 371/99282-99297). With Hong Kong leased by China to the British until 1997, the island became the site of ideological conflict in the dawn of the Communist era. A cluster of files in 1952 provide detailed accounts of political activity in Hong Kong by both Communist and Nationalist supporters, (see FO 371/99243-99246). There are reports of Hong Kong inhabitants being kidnapped at gunpoint and taken back to Chinese territory. The volatility of the situation eventually caused the Foreign Office to grant the Hong Kong police permission to return fire should China endanger the safety of its residents (see FO 371/99275).

Reports on the Shanghai Water Works Company and the Shanghai Electric Construction Company (see FO 371/99302) as well as deliberations on the future of the Anglo-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and China’s expression of willingness to trade with the UK through the China National Import-Export Corporation (see FO 371/99303) are typical of this period.

China's involvement in the Korean War had a crippling effect on the Chinese economy and put pressures on the leadership as it tried to carry through land and industrial reform. Nationwide planning began in 1953 as soon as political control had been established in rural and urban areas. The first Five Year Plan was introduced by the Chinese Government with an emphasis on capital construction and heavy industry. Official pronouncements suggested a determination to build a powerful industrial economy based upon the Soviet model. Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi were the key figures in pushing forward these policies under Mao Zedong.

In his annual report from the British Embassy in Beijing, Humphrey Trevelyan, the British ambassador, comments:

"1953 marked the opening of a new phase in the development of the Chinese Communist State. Until the end of 1952 the Communists were principally occupied with consolidation of their power and defence against counter-revolution, the organisation of their administration, land reform and the restoration of pre-war production. In 1953 they set about building the new industrialised Socialist State. This year was the first year of the first Five-Year Plan. There has been mismanagement in the State industries and in the distribution of goods, and inadequate financial control, which had been fully reported in the Chinese Press under the system of public confession; but it appears probable that the deficiencies are disproportionately emphasised in the non-Communist Press. Development will no doubt be uneven, and lacking in the administrative and technological refinements of more advanced countries: but it would be a mistake to discount the progress made.

The Chinese Communists show a determination to drive forward, while correcting their mistakes. They have the benefit of much Soviet experience and machinery. They have an iron control, exercised through Party officials, over the Trade Unions, which, as in the Soviet Union, have become a Department of the Government, mainly concerned with the increase of production. The testimony of British managers in Shanghai to the increased efficiency of their mills, factories and wharfs under the Communist control of labour is most striking. Financial stability has been maintained and there is increased confidence in the currency. In spite of all the mistakes, the country's industry is likely to develop fast..." (see FO 371/110194).

Trevelyan points out the considerable impact of the UN trade embargo:
"The United Nations Embargo remained in force throughout the year. The proportion of trade with the Communist bloc is said to have increased to 70%. There are political reasons for this diversion, but it must be due as much to denial by the West as to a deliberate act of Chinese policy. The Chinese are mainly interested in embargoed goods. They must want the Embargo lifted, not only to get supplies from the west, but also to increase their bargaining power with the Communist world, with which they are almost certainly trading on unfavourable terms." (see FO 371/110194).

There are a good number of files on China's economy, industrial development and the introduction of collective agreements to fulfil the Five Year Plan, 1953-1957; (please see FO 371/105232-105236 and 115079-115081).

Other interesting files in Section I include material on:

• developments in China’s agriculture: report on production in the years 1949-1952 and observations on annual harvests.
• Quemoy and the Matsu islands, the First Taiwan Straits Crisis and the involvement of the US Navy.
• the US-Formosa Defence Treaty and proposed ceasefire in the Formosa/Taiwan Straits.
• textile mills in China and cotton production.
• tea production.
• Sino-Soviet Petroleum Company’s activities in Sinkiang.
• the oil, iron and steel industries in China.
• fishing and sugar industries in Formosa/Taiwan.
• political and economic reports on Macao.
• the creation of the Chinese People's Construction Bank and National Economic Construction Bonds.
• Jardine, Matheson & Company.
• railway and road construction.
• the flooding of the Yangtze River.
• developments in the areas of education, housing and health.
• debates on the question of representation of China at the United Nations.
• civil disturbances in Hong Kong in 1956.

The years after 1949 can also be seen as a period of disengagement as discussed by Robert Bickers in his final chapter ‘After Colonialism’ in ‘Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism’ (Manchester University Press, 1999). Despite Britain’s formal recognition of the new government on 6 January 1950, this brought few tangible gains for foreign firms. Within five years taxation measures and labour problems had led most British enterprises to extricate themselves to the relative safety of Hong Kong. Missionaries also came under pressure from the new regime and they were targeted as “agents of imperialism”. The China Inland Mission pulled out in December 1950 (see FO 371/92334) and foreign business personnel often needed help in the protracted procedure of obtaining exit permits. Many files examine the difficulties faced by British subjects in China after 1950. Mao Zedong adopted a very strong ‘anti-American’ and ‘anti-imperialist’ outlook which became even further entrenched during the Korean War.

The despatch from the British Embassy in Beijing from Mr C O’Neill on the details of the first Five Year Plan, dated 18 August 1955, gives specific details on the proposed massive increase in industrial production. Mr O’Neill notes that:

“Of the 694 large industrial projects which are included in the First Five Year Plan, 455 will be completed during the period. Over 70 per cent of the increase in industrial production will come from existing enterprises in which some of these projects are in fact incorporated. A great proportion of the investment in heavy industrial plant which is being made during the First Five Year Plan will not bring any return till after 1957. Of the large increase in productive capacity planned for coal, steel, pig iron and electric power and for which money will be laid out during the Five Year Plan, only about half will go into production during the period.

Iron and Steel. During the First Five Year Plan development of the Chinese iron and steel industry will centre round the existing combine at Anshan. New Steel combines will however be built at Wuhan on the Yangtze and at Paotow, some 300 miles west of Peking, where new deposits of iron ore and coal have been surveyed. No indication is given how much of the Wuhan and Paotow plants will be completed during the period of the Plan nor of their eventual size.

Considrable detail has now been given of the Anshan combine which when completed (sometime after 1957) will produce annually 2.5 million tons of pig iron and 3.22 million tons of steel…”

(see FO 371/115080).

These records allow researchers to assess the proposals of the first Five Year Plan in detail. Mao Zedong’s military and political tactics had united the country under a strong central government. This demanded mass participation and exerted close control over the population. The mid-1950s also marked the high point of Soviet influence on Chinese politics, but Sino-Soviet tensions were set to rise towards the end of the decade.

Section II: 1957-1966

With the documents in Section II it is possible to look at how Mao Zedong rejected Stalinism in the late 1950s and began the process of hammering out a Chinese economic alternative. There are files on industrial and economic development under Mao Zedong’s leadership, including the Great Leap Forward campaign of 1958-1962, the highly ambitious plan to use the power of socialist economics to increase Chinese production of steel, coal and electricity, the collectivization of agriculture and the prosecution of a remorseless campaign of modernisation. These allow researchers to look at the social, political, economic and cultural changes that transformed twentieth century China. The grandiose aims were dashed in the face of reality, massive famine and a huge death toll, difficulties within the education system and a less promising economic situation. The material in Section II provides lots of evidence for researchers to analyse the impact, successes and failures of the first Five Year Plan, 1953-1957, the Great Leap Forward Campaign and the Socialist Education Movement.

With the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the repudiation of orthodox Soviet style economic measures, the 1960s also witnessed important changes in China’s foreign policy and increasing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. These developments are scrutinised in detail by British officials in China and at the Foreign Office in London. They form the subject of regular discussions with the United States and Commonwealth partners.

This period was characterised by continued US military and financial aid for Taiwan.  The US provided a further US $1,929 million between 1958 and 1965, before US financial assistance for Taiwan was withdrawn in 1965. During this period aid was broadly allocated as follows:

Infrastructure: 37%
Human Resources Development: 26%
Agriculture: 21%
Industry: 15%

Taiwan adopted an export promotion strategy with export diversification as the dominant feature from 1963 onwards.  The creation of export processing zones in 1963 helped private enterprise. The advantages of small and medium-sized concerns was their flexibility to adjust to changing market needs and the ability to draw upon surplus labour from the declining agricultural sector.  Major efforts were made to promote foreign investment and trade. Banks offered low-interest loans to exporters.

In mainland China, after 1957, Shell was the only British company left in Shanghai and its office was run by Chinese managers. All other firms had retreated to Hong Kong. Shell closed its Shanghai office in 1966, (for more details see FO 371/114997 and FO 371/120866). The return of major foreign investment had to await the early 1990s in the post Tiananmen era of Den Xiaoping’s economic reforms and “socialist market economy” which set China upon the path of rapid economic growth.

Key files for 1957-1966 cover:

• fortnightly summaries for Beijing and Shanghai.
• the Great Leap Forward campaign and the repudiation of orthodox Soviet style economic measures.
• industrial development with particular emphasis on coal, steel and oil.
• Twelve Year Plan for Agriculture.
• the three years of natural disasters, 1959-1961.
• rebellion in Tibet.
• the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations from 1960 onwards.
• reports on Macao.
• the political manoeuvrings of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi.
• the Socialist Education Movement launched by Mao Zedong in 1963 in an attempt to restore his political base and eliminate opposition. In chapter 16 of ‘Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000’ (OUP second edition 2002) Jack Gray suggests that Chinese politics “appeared to be stable” for about three years, the damage inflicted by the “Great Leap” was being repaired and the rate of economic growth improved satisfactorily. Yet behind the facade of national unity a new process of polarization had begun.
• the increased conflict between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.  
• initial phases of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s massive campaign of ideological renewal and the cult of personality.
• representation of China at the United Nations.
• economic growth in Taiwan supported by US financial aid.

Soviet criticisms of Mao Zedong’s radicalism spurred him on rather than restraining his actions. The mass of material gathered by British officials provides scholars with an interesting insight into the failures of the Great Leap Forward. The files show that a return to rather more pragmatic measures after 1962 did not in any way dampen Mao Zedong’s enthusiasm for revolutionary renewal and ideological success. These circumstances led directly into the Cultural  Revolution with its large poster campaigns, newspaper attacks, cult of personality and ideological rhetoric. Mao Zedong used his own prestige to undermine important colleagues such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

Section III: 1967-1980

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, a further period of immense social and political upheaval that led to nationwide chaos and economic disarray, dominates the files from 1967 onwards.  It led into the power struggles and political instability after 1969, which culminated in the arrest of the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Mao's last wife and the leading figure of the group, and her close associates Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen).   Material after Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976 focuses on the policies of Deng Xiaoping.

Important topics and events featured in these files include:

• the radical “January Revolution” in Shanghai in 1967.
• the Gang of Four
• increased conflict between Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, causing further political instability after 1966.
• vitriolic policy debates, factional power struggles and student demonstrations.
• the dismissal and disgrace of Liu Shaoqi.
• the emergence of Lin Biao as Mao Zedong’s second in command – during the Cultural Revolution he put the People’s Liberation Army firmly behind Mao Zedong.
• Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969.
• Reduction of US military forces in Taiwan.
• Disagreements between Lin Biao and Mao Zedong at the Lushan Conference in September 1970. The former wished to fill the position of PRC Chairman vacated by Liu Shaoqi, but Mao Zedong had expressly avoided reference to such a position in the version of the Constitution being drafted at that time.
• rapprochement and decision by the United States to ease the trade embargo.
• discussion of China’s relations with the United States in the early 1970s brought the diplomatic skills of Zhou Enlai back into prominence and Lin Biao increasingly felt threatened by such an influential figure.
• improvements in China’s foreign trade.
• Lin Biao’s attempted coup in September 1971 – having failed he fled the country with several of his senior military associates, but was killed in an air crash in Mongolia the following day.
• the ongoing succession question.
• the Red Guard factions, nationwide chaos and economic disarray.
• the “Down to the Countryside Movement” encouraging “young intellectuals” to move from the cities to the countryside.
• Japanese resumption of full diplomatic relations with China in September 1971.
• Fourth Five Year Plan.
• Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972.
• Return of Deng Xiaoping as Vice Premier in April 1973.
• major changes in regional military command personnel in order to break up all remnants of Lin Biao’s network of support.
• Death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975. His son, Jiang Jinngguo, had been appointed as Prime Minister in 1972 and he took over as President of Taiwan in 1978. Martial law still continued, but Jiang Jingguo started a process of liberalisation and democratization. He played an important part in Taiwan’s economic development. US financial aid to Taiwan had ceased in 1965. Expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the 1973 Oil Crisis and the change in American foreign policy with the full recognition of the PRC on mainland China, all adversely impacted Taiwan’s economy. 
• Jiang Jingguo’s Ten Major Construction Projects during the 1970s served as a basis for heavy industrial development in Taiwan. Six schemes focused on the transport infrastructure; the others provided for an oil refinery, a shipyard, a steel factory and a nuclear power plant. His policies encouraged a strong export driven economy and paved the way for further improvements and modernization.
• All remaining US military forces left Taiwan in 1978 and President Carter pushed through the Taiwan Relations Act terminating any international obligations previously made between the two countries, but allowing quasi-diplomatic relations to continue.
• Death of Zhou Enlai – demonstrations in his memory in Beijing were suppressed by force.
• the downfall of the Gang of Four after Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976.
• Hua Guofeng’s policies as the Communist Party’s new Chairman followed by the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping and his brand of  “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.
• Establishment of full diplomatic relations between PRC and the United States on 1 January 1979 followed by Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States.
• Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea denounced by China, Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and withdrawal of Chinese economic aid for Vietnam.
• Chinese policies of retrenchment in an attempt to control inflation.

Deng Xiaoping refused to take the supreme office himself, but by 1980 he had secured the appointment of Hu Yaobang as head of the CCP and Zhao Ziyang as premier. Both were close associates and firm supporters of Deng’s policies. There was now a collective leadership in China. Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were balanced by more conservative figures such as Chen Yun and this meant that Deng’s economic reforms had to proceed slowly, one step at a time. He had to argue his case, but with perseverance, despite setbacks and problems, small changes led to significant progress.

In Taiwan, the phase of export promotion was followed by industrial consolidation in the period between 1973 and 1980. Competition from other low-cost manufacturing centres led to the development of capital-intensive industries. In 1980 Taiwan was expelled from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Despite this Taiwan was developing into a “strong Asian Tiger economy”, a leading exporter of textiles and inexpensive commercial goods.

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